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Abstract
We analyze the distributional e¤ects of adjustment cost in an environment with incom-
plete capital market. We nd that a higher adjustment cost for human capital acquisition
slows down the intergenerational mobility and results in a persistent inequality across gen-
erations. A low depreciation cost of human capital contributes to longer life of the capital
which could elevate this adjustment cost and hence contribute to this inequality persis-
tence. A lower total factor productivity could hurt poor with a higher marginal product
when human capital has low depreciation. This could add to the slowing of intergenera-
tional mobility when adjustment cost is present. The quantitative analysis of our model
suggests that the human capital adjustment cost is nontrivial to reproduce the observed
persistence of inequality.
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1. Introduction
It is an open question whether the son of a poor father will become a high
paid executive manager. The evidence during the last two decades points to the
direction that such intergenerational mobility is slow (Machin, 2004). Clark and
Cummins (2012) establish that there is considerable persistence in the wealth status
of households in England from 1800 to 2012. They predict that it will take another
200 years to complete the process of social mobility. Our paper aims to understand
the determinants of such mobility in an environment with incomplete markets where
human capital is the driver of growth and it is costly to adjust human capital.
The seminal paper of Becker and Tomes (1979) draws the conclusion that a stable
distribution of income could emerge explained by individual and market lucks. Their
crucial assumption is that the credit market is perfect implying that individuals with
low wealth and high marginal product of capital could borrow from individuals with
the opposite trait. This tends to equalize the di¤erences in wealth. The residual
inequality is then mostly attributed to luck. Since then a considerable literature
(Loury, 1981, Mulligan, 1997, Banerjee and Newman, 1993, Galore and Zeira, 1993,
Bandyopadhyay and Basu, 2005, Benabou, 1996) has evolved emphasizing the role
of credit market imperfection in perpetuating the inequality.
In this paper, we explore how some factors important to the investment climate
such as adjustment costs, could a¤ect distributional dynamics. As in Loury (1981),
Galor and Zeira (1993) and Benabou (2000, 2002), we develop a scenario with missing
credit and insurance markets. Individuals di¤er in terms of initial distribution of
human capital and abilities. The di¤erences in abilities are due to idiosyncratic
shocks to productivity which cannot be hedged using an insurance market. We
demonstrate that in such a scenario the presence of adjustment cost of human capital
could impede the process of social mobility.
The human capital adjustment cost is modeled as a rising marginal cost schedule
for investment in human capital. Such an adjustment cost can arise due to a number
of reasons. First, there could be basic human inertia to respond to change and
adjust to new opportunities or environment. An example of such inertia is that an
adult nds a better job opportunity with a higher pay in a region di¤erent from her
home town but due to friends and family ties, she is reluctant to move (Alessina and
Giuliano (2010) ). Second, this adjustment cost could be attributed to market based
factors such as higher cost of advanced education compared to primary schooling or
a higher employment adjustment cost as in Hansen and Sargent (1980).
Why does a higher adjustment cost slow down the social mobility? When the
credit market is missing, investment opportunities (which is investment in human
capital in our model) facing individuals are limited to the resources they have in hand.
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Given a production function with private diminishing returns to reproducible human
capital, poor with lower human capital have a higher marginal product than rich.
Thus, their relative growth potential is higher compared to rich. However, if capital
adjustment cost is present, this growth of the poor will be impeded because poor
face a higher marginal cost of investment when they try to grow. Thus adjustment
cost will slowdown the process of social mobility leading to a higher persistence of
human capital inequality in the aggregate. The central point of our paper is to
demonstrate that a society facing such a costly adjustment of human capital could
experience perpetual inequality and low intergenerational mobility measured by the
serial correlation between the wealth of current and future generations. The role of
this type of human capital adjustment cost has been ignored in the inequality and
intergenerational mobility literature and this is precisely where our paper contributes.
In addition to adjustment cost, we also look at the role of the depreciation
cost of human capital in determining social mobility. A lower depreciation of human
capital makes a generation inherit a lot of capital from its predecessors. This lowers
the marginal return to investment further when adjustment cost is already present.
Thus, it particularly hurts poors incentive to invest in education and could lower
social mobility even more. An example of such low depreciation of human capital
is the transfer of knowledge of a primitive farming technology in a less developed
country from one generation to another which could provide little incentive to the
current generation to learn new technology of farming.
We set up an incomplete market model in which households are heterogenous
in terms of initial human capital and ability. They receive a warm-glow utility from
investing in childs education in the spirit of Galor and Zeira (1993). As in Loury
(1981) human capital is the only form of reproducible capital in the economy. Idio-
syncratic productivity shocks together with initial di¤erence in human capital could
give rise to current cross-sectional inequality and such inequality transmits from one
generation to another. The absence of credit and insurance markets prevents agents
from mitigating negative idiosyncratic shocks. An unlucky agent su¤ering a bad pro-
ductivity shock invests less resources to childs education which means that the child
inherits less human capital. How quickly the o¤spring gets over this disadvantage
depends on how costly it is to adjust the human capital. We develop closed form
formula for the endogenous law of motion of inequality. The key theoretical result
that emanates from this closed form solution is that the persistence of inequality is
higher in economies with a higher adjustment cost either in terms of a steeper curva-
ture of the marginal cost of investment or a lower depreciation cost of capital. To the
best of our knowledge, our closed form solution for the law of motion of growth and
cross sectional variance in the presence of incomplete depreciation of human capital
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is novel and new to the literature.
Our calibration exercise suggests that the human capital adjustment cost has to
be kept at a nontrivial level to reproduce the observed degree of social mobility, long-
run inequality and growth. The calibrated social mobility parameter accords well
with the slow intergenerational mobility predicted by Clark and Cummins (2012) and
others. An adults response to luck matches well with the well known move to oppor-
tunity (MTO) programme in North America (reported by Katz et al., (2001)). The
sensitivity analysis with key parameters such as adjustment cost and depreciation
rate suggests that the persistence of inequality is consistently higher in economies
with higher adjustment cost and lower depreciation of capital. Impulse responses of
human capital with respect to initial luck di¤erences suggest that the social mobil-
ity is slower in economies with higher adjustment cost, higher share of capital and
a lower total factor productivity. These are all consistent with our key theoretical
results.
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 presents the model and the dynamics
and equilibrium of individual wealth accumulation. Section 3 reports the quantitative
analysis of the model. Section 4 concludes.
2. The model
2.1. Preference and technology
Consider a continuum heterogeneous households i 2 [0; 1] in overlapping gener-
ations. Each household i consists of an adult of generation t attached to a child of
generation t + 1. A child only inherits human capital from her parents and does
not make any decision as her consumption is already included in that of her par-
ents. Adult, at date t puts emplyes a unit raw labour into the production process
which translates into hit e¢ ciency units (human capital) for the production of nal
goods and services to earn income (yit) using the following Cobb-Douglas production
function:
yit = a1'it (ht)
1  (hit)
 (1)
where a1 > 0 is simply an exogenous productivity parameter,  2 (0; 1), ht rep-
resents the aggregate stock of knowledge in the spirit of Arrow (1962) and Romer
(1986) which is given to the adult.1 Individuals are subject to an i.i.d. idiosyn-
1Such a technology basically means that there is private diminishing returns but social constant
returns to human capital.
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cratic productivity shocks ('it) which drive their total marginal productivity. The
idiosyncratic shock 'it follows the process: ln'it  N( 2=2; 2).
2.1.1. Utility function and budget constraint
Agents care about their own consumption (cit) and the human capital stock of
their children (hit+1), which can be justied by "joy of giving". In other words, the
utility of the adult at date t is given by:2
u (cit; hit+1) = ln cit +  lnhit+1 (2)
where 0 <  < 1 is the degree of parental altruism, hit+1 represents the human capital
of the o¤spring of agent i. At the end of the period, parents allocate income between
current consumption (cit) and saving (sit). The latter is used for investment in human
capital accumulation of the o¤spring as shown in (4). The budget constraint is thus
given by:
cit + sit = yit (3)
2.1.2. Technology of human capital production
The human capital is the only form of reproducible input in our model. The stock
of human capital inherited by the current adult from her predecessors determines her
state of technological knowledge which she can modify to advance the technological
frontier. This modication can be done by investing in education or R&D. The
production of the next period human capital (hit+1) takes place with the aid of two
factors: (i) past human capital (hit), (ii) investment in schooling (sit):
hit+1 = a2h
1 
it ((1  )hit + sit) (4)
where  2 (0; 1),  2 (0; 1) and a2 > 0. The human capital production function is
in spirit to Benabou (2002) except for the inclusion of the depreciation parameter
. The parameter  determines the curvature of the marginal return to investment
(@hit+1=@sit) which we ascribe to adjustment cost. The marginal return to investment
is given by:
2The choice of a logarithmic utility function and altruistic agents with a "joy of giving" motive
is merely for simplicity. Also see Glomm and Ravikumar (1992), Galor and Zeira (1993), Saint-Paul
and Verdier (1993) and Benabou, 2000) for similar settings. A version of dynastic altruism model
as in Barro (1985) (with complete depreciation of human capital) with physical capital and labour
are worked out in the Appendix B of this paper.
5
@hit+1=@sit = a2= (1   + sit=hit)1  (5)
Inverse of this marginal return to investment is the marginal cost of investment which
is therefore rising in investment per unit of human capital (sit=hit). The fact that 
is a fraction is fundamental for a rising marginal cost of investment. Such a rising
marginal cost reects the adjustment cost of investment in human capital. Hereafter,
we call  as the adjustment cost parameter.
Figure 1 plots the marginal return to investment, @hit+1=@sit against sit=hit for
 = 0:8 (our baseline value in the calibration later) and  = 0:6.3 Lower  makes
the investment return schedule shift downward with a steeper curvature. This steep
decrease in marginal return investment due to lower  is ascribed to a higher adjust-
ment cost of human capital marginal cost. If  reaches the upper bound of unity,
there is zero adjustment cost and the investment technology reverts to a standard
linear depreciation rule. This notion of  as the degree of human capital adjustment
cost is borrowed from the standard capital adjustment cost technology used in the
macroeconomics literature (see for example, Lucas and Prescott, 1971, Basu, 1987,
and Basu et al., 2012).
Figure 1: E¤ect of a change in  on the marginal return to investment
The inclusion of the depreciation cost parameter  in the human capital produc-
3The other two parameters a2 and  are xed at their baseline levels of 0:03 and 1:655 respectively.
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tion function is novel in our paper, and in this respect it di¤ers from Benabous
(2002) human capital technology. This depreciation cost determines how much hu-
man capital the child inherits from her parents. Thus even if parents undertake
zero investment in childs education, unlike Benabou (2000) child still inherits some
human capital in proportion to (1   )hit. Viewed from this perspective, one may
think of 1    as the degree of intergenerational spillover knowledge as in Mankiw,
Romer and Weil (1992) and Bandyopadhyay and Basu (2005).
The lower rate of depreciation of human capital makes the capital last longer
which contributes to a lower marginal return to investment and thus higher marginal
cost as seen from Figure 2. Unlike a change in , the marginal return to investment
is less sensitive to a change in . A lower rate of depreciation lowers the intercept of
the marginal return to investment schedule (which is a2= (1  )1  ) and it attens
its slope. The marginal rate of return to investment (@hit+1=@sit) thus undergoes
a downward shift in response to a lower . A lower depreciation cost makes the
current generation inherit a lot of human capital from ancestors which provides them
less incentive to investment because of its negative e¤ect on the marginal return to
investment.
Figure 2: E¤ect of a change in  on the marginal return to investment
Lower  and lower  thus drive down the return to investment, raise the marginal
cost of investment and thus discourages the adults incentive to invest in schooling
or learn a new technology. The central point of this paper is that both these factors
contribute to less social mobility and perpetual inequality.
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2.2. Initial distribution of human capital
At the beginning, each adult of the initial generation is endowed with human
capital hi0. She supplies it inelastically to a privately-held rm, which is subject to
idiosyncratic shock that brings individual-specic risk to income and investment.4
Households are then both consumers and entrepreneurs. The distribution of hi0 takes
a known probability distribution,
lnhi0  N(0; 20) (6)
and it evolves over time along an equilibrium trajectory.
2.3. Equilibrium
In equilibrium, all individuals behave optimally and the aggregate consistency
conditions hold.
Optimality: An adult cohort t solves the following problem, obtained by sub-
stituting (3), (4) and (2),
max
sit;lit
ln (yit   sit) +  ln ((1  )hit + sit) (7)
taking as given hit. The optimization yields the following optimal investment func-
tions,
sit = (yit   (1  )hit) = (1 + ) (8)
An adults optimal investment decision constitutes both new investment plus a re-
placement of depreciated capital. Note that a lower rate of depreciation depresses
current investment because it lowers the marginal return to investment.5
Aggregate Consistency: (i) ct 
R
citdi, st 
R
sitdi, yt 
R
yitdi, ht 
R
hitdi
where the left hand side variable in each of them means the aggregate. (ii) The
aggregate budget constraint is thus given by:6
ct + st = yt (9)
4Such type of undiversied entrepreneurial and investment risks are a common feature of the
developing word, according to Angeletos and Calvet, (2006). Even in the United States, they argue,
the majority of rms constitutes of privately owned companies.
5To see it, check from (4) that @hit+1=@sit is positively related to :
6We use the operators
R
and E interchangeably in the text to denote aggregation across indi-
viduals.
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2.4. Individual optimal human capital accumulation
The ith individual optimal human capital accumulation is given by, from (1), (4)
and (8),
hit+1 = hit
 
1   + a1'ith1 t h 1it

(10)
where
  a2 (= (1 + )) (11)
Thus, the ith individual o¤spring human capital is determined by both the depreci-
ation and adjustment cost of human capital and her parent income.
2.5. Are children poor due to bad luck or poor parents?
We start with the age-old question: How does inequality transmit through gen-
erations through past lucks and initial conditions? To see this clearly, loglinearize
(10) around a balanced growth path where all agents are identical in terms of luck
and human capital 'it = ' = 1 and hit = ht, respectively. One gets
7:
lnhit+1 ' t + % lnhit +  ln'it (12)
where
t  ln+  ln (1   + a1) + (1  ) lnht (13)
%  1  (1  ) 2 (0; 1) (14)
  a1= (1   + a1) 2 (0; 1) (15)
Since we can do the same for the jth individual,
hit+1=% ( lnhit) +  ( ln'it) (16)
where hit+1  lnhit+1   lnhjt+1, hit  lnhit   lnhjt and 'it  ln'it   ln'jt.
When the capital market is incomplete, di¤erence in initial human capital of the
rst generation as well as di¤erence in lucks play a central role in transmitting initial
inequality through generations. The rst term in (16) shows the e¤ect of di¤erence
in human capital of parents while the second term captures the e¤ect of parents luck
on the wealth inequality of their kids. Both di¤erences in initial human capital and
lucks transmit through generations. How they impact future generations depend on
7See Appendix A for details on the derivation.
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the parameters % and : which in turn depend on the structural parameters. The
initial di¤erence in wealth has a decaying e¤ect on the wealth di¤erence of successive
generations. The rate of decay is determined by % 2 (0; 1) : A larger % makes the
initial inequality have a persistent e¤ect and thus slows down social mobility.8 It is
easy to verify that % is larger if adjustment cost is higher (lower ), depreciation cost
() is lower.
2.5.1. Depreciation, TFP and Social Mobility
If depreciation rate is 100% ( = 1), the TFP parameter a1 has no e¤ect on
the transmission of inequality. To see this clearly note that a1 inuences the social
mobility through the term  in (15); when  = 1,  is independent of a1. However, in
case of incomplete depreciation (0 <  < 1), a lower a1 slows down intergenerational
mobility.
To see the intuition, think of a lower a1 as a higher tax on capital.9 Such a tax
discourages investment. It hurts poor households more than the rich because poor
have a higher marginal product of capital to start with due to diminishing returns
to investment and incomplete markets. Start from a scenario, where rich (i with
ht=hit < 1 ) and poor (j with ht=hjt > 1) have the same luck, the relative marginal
investment returns of rich to poor (based on (1), (5) and (8)) is given by,
@hit+1=@sit
@hjt+1=@sjt
=
 
a1' (ht=hit)
1  + 1  
a1' (ht=hjt)
1  + 1  
!1 
(17)
which is less than unity. If a capital income tax is in place (lower a1), it will boost the
above relative marginal investment returns of rich further. Thus the convergence will
be slower. Note that if there is complete depreciation ( = 1) this relative marginal
product is independent of a1.
2.6. Distributional Dynamics
We are now ready to characterize the dynamics of the cross sectional variance of
human capital:
Proposition 1. Given the initial cross sectional inequality characterized by (6) and
(10), the dynamics of inequality and growth are given by the following law of motions,
respectively,
8The social mobilty is purely determined by the inverse of % (see Benabou, 2002), which is also
the focal point this paper.
9Dene the capital income tax rate as  : Re-parameterize a1 as 1   :
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2t+1 = 
2 ln
2 exp
 
 22t

+ (a1)
2 exp
  
0:5! + 2

2t + 
2

+ 2a1 exp ((0:5! + =)
2
t )
(+ a1 exp (0:5!2t ))
2
(18)
and
t+1 = ln+ 0:5 (1=   1)
 
2t   2t+1

+  ln
 
+ a1 exp
 
0:5!2t

(19)
where
t+1  lnht+1   lnht
  1  
!  (  1) (2= +   2) < 0
  1= +   1 > 0
Proof. See Appendix B.
The intergenerational mobility and the dynamics of (the cross-sectional) wealth
inequality are, therefore, characterized jointly by four crucial parameters, namely ,
,  and a1. The dynamics of inequality is determined by its own history. It is not
inuenced by growth. On the other hand, the growth rate depends on the current
and past inequality. This is evident by the fact that 2t+1 is a function of 
2
t alone
while t+1 depends on 
2
t+1 and 
2
t .
To get the get some basic comparative statics results, take the loglinear version
in (18), which implies the following inequality dynamics (see Appendix A)10,
2t+1 = %
22t + 
22 (20)
The dynamics of income inequality (2t;y) can then be derived from (1) and (20),
2t+1;y = %
22t;y + 
2
 
1  %2 + 22 (21)
The capital share parameter, , and the adjustment cost parameter, , have oppos-
ing e¤ects on the persistence of inequality. When  is higher, the relative growth
potential of the poor with respect to rich (due to poors higher marginal product) is
dampened which means that the process of convergence between rich and the poor
10Because of its highly nonlinear nature. It is di¢ cult to ascertain the comparative statics e¤ects
of these four underlying parameters. We study them numerically in the next section. The numerical
comparative the results accord with the loglinearized version.
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will be slower. This explains why the initial inequality will tend to persist when 
is higher.11 On the other hand, a higher adjustment cost (lower ) will make the
process of convergence between the poor and the rich slower because it is costly for
the poor to invest. This technological disadvantage imposed by capital adjustment
cost is compounded by the credit market imperfection which makes the intergener-
ational mobility slower and inequality more persistent.12 These e¤ects of  and 
on the intergenerational mobility are remarkably robust to alternative environment.
In the appendix, we outline a model with dynastic altruism as in Barro (1974) and
derive the same results.
Why does a lower depreciation rate make the inequality process more persistent?
When human capital depreciates slowly, it makes the current capital stock to have
a stronger negative e¤ect on investment as shown in Figure 2 and eq. (8). Such a
negative e¤ect on investment arises due to a higher marginal cost of investment when
capital is long lived. Since investment is the only vehicle for intergenerational mobil-
ity, lower investment in human capital caused by low depreciation slows down this
process of social mobility and makes the inequality more persistent. The following
proposition summarizes the results for the intergenerational mobility.
Proposition 2. A higher degree of adjustment cost (lower ), lower depreciation
cost () and a higher capital share  make the intergenerational mobility slower and
the inequality process more persistent.
We next turn to the relationship between the short run dynamics of growth and
inequality. The loglinear version of the growth equation is given by (see Appendix
A),
t+1 = ln+  [ln (1   + a1)] + 0:52 (  1) + 0:52t% (%  1) (22)
The growth rate (t+1) at t + 1 responds inversely to state of cross sectional
inequality (2t+1). The strength of this negative association depends positively on the
degree of adjustment cost in human capital. This inverse relationship is not surprising
in a model with imperfect credit market. In such models, due to diminishing returns
to capital,  2 (0; 1), the poor have a higher marginal product than the rich in
11The inverse relationship between rate of convergence and the capital share parameter is well
known in the convergence literature (see for example, Benabou, 2002).
12When  is close to unity, the adjustment cost ceases to play any role in determining the
inequality persistence because the poor do not have any relative advantage in terms of higher
marginal product.
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the economy. When they cannot borrow from the rich who have a lower marginal
product and invest due to the credit market imperfection, Pareto e¢ ciency cannot be
achieved. Therefore, in such an economy higher inequality corresponds to a greater
ine¢ ciency and thus lower growth.
2.7. Long-run inequality and growth
Until now we explored how initial di¤erences in human capital, luck, depreciation
and adjustment costs determine the transmission of inequality across generations.
We found that initial inequality tends to lose importance while other parameters
including , ,  govern the intergnerational transmission of inequality. We now
formally establish that the long-run inequality and growth are independent of initial
wealth di¤erence and determined crucially by these parameters.
The steady-state inequality and growth are given by the following expressions
(derived in the appendix) respectively:
2 = 2 ln
2 exp
 
 22

+ (a1)
2 exp
  
0:5! + 2

2 + 2

+ 2a1 exp ((0:5! + =)
2)
(+ a1 exp (0:5!2))
2
(23)
and
 = ln+  ln

+ a1 exp
 
0:5!2
	
(24)
The steady-state equivalent of the log-linearized version of the model has simpler
expressions. Considering (20),
2 = 22=
 
1  %2 (25)
The steady-state income inequality (2y) can also easily be derived from (21):
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2;y = 
2
 
1  %2 + 22 =  1  %2 (26)
Finally, the long-run growth rate is given by, from (22):
 = ln+  [ln (1   + a1)] + 0:52 (  (1 + %)) = (1 + %) (27)
Inequality in the long-run is thus mainly the result of individuals di¤erences in
human capital investment decision as a response to di¤erences in luck. We summarize
these results in terms of the following proposition:
13Note that when  = 1, all of the loglinearized and the exact solutions converge. For instance,
the steady-state inequality in both (23) and (25) will reduce to 2 = 2= ((1  ) (2  (1  ) )).
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Proposition 3. The long-run distribution of wealth (2) is a function of initial dis-
tribution in luck (2) and independent of the initial distribution of 20 whereas 
2
increases in  and decreases with respect ;  and a1:
Proof. See (25) and (26).
Higher capital share () slows down the convergence between rich and poor and
thus not surprisingly it promotes long run inequality. What is surprising is that ; 
and a1 have opposite e¤ects on social mobility and long run inequality (2). For
example, a lower , , a1 raise % (slowing down social mobility) but it also lowers the
long run inequality 2. To see the reasons for this asymmetry check the following two
expressions for elasticities of childs human capital with respect to parents human
capital and parents luck based on (12):
@ lnhit+1=@ lnhit = % (28)
@ lnhit+1=@ ln'it =  (29)
These two elasticities behave exactly opposite in response to change in , , or a1.
Since the long run variance of inequality is determined by luck (but not by the initial
level of inequality), the luck e¤ect nally dominates and this explains the asymmetry
of comparative statics behavior of 2 and :
3. Quantitative analysis
In this section, we numerically examine (18) and (23) to determine the role of
 and  in intergenerational mobility, inequality dynamics and equilibrium, respec-
tively. We use (19) and (24) for the growth dynamics and equilibrium.
We rst construct parameter values which reasonably reect real economies. We
set the elasticities of output for human capital at 0:5 ). Assuming a psychological
discount factor of 0:96, we set  = 0:9630  0:3, in a period of 30 years (de la Croix
and Michel, 2002, p.255).14
There are ve technology parameters, namely a1; a2; ;  and : Following Barro,
Mankiw and Sala-i-Martin, 1995 , we set  = 0:5. The choices of 2 = 0:38, a1 = 1:96
and a2 = 1:655 are made to target a steady state variance of the log wealth (2)
equal to 0.2422 and the variance of log of income (2y) equal to 0:441 and a long-run
14A psychological discount factor of 0:96 matches a 4:17 percent rate of time preference  in an
innite lived agent model. That is,  = 1= (1 + ) = 1=(1 + :0417) = 0:96.
14
annual average growth rate of about 1:79 percent of the US economy for the last
125 years.15 The remaining two parameters  and  are chosen to target the social
mobility parameter % as in (28) and the wealth elasticity with respect to luck, 
based on (29). Regarding % the estimates for intergenerational persistence measured
by wealth elasticity vary considerably in the literature.16 Our baseline estimate of
social mobility is 0.73 which is in line with the estimates of Mazumder and Clark
and Cummins (2012).
The wealth elasticity with respect to luck,  is an indicator of agents response
to luck or opportunity. We use the response rate of households from the well known
move to opportunity programme (MTO) as reported by Katz et al., (2001) as a a
proxy for the agents response to luck. Katz et al. (2001) report that about 48%
to 62% households living in high poverty region in Boston move through the MTO
programme. Fixing  = 0:03 and  = 0:8 as in Basu et al. (2012 ), we get an estimate
for this response to luck around 0.53 which is in the range of Katz et al.s (2001)
study.17 Table 1 summarizes the baseline parameter values.
15Assuming a lognormal distribution of income, the mean-median ratio implies 0:44 average
log-income variance for the United States for the years 1991, 1994, 1997, and 2000, based on
Luxembourg Income Study (UNU-WIDER, 2007).
16Note that %2 '   @2t+1=@2t (Appendix B) . % in each table is calculated based on the
loglinearized version (12) which is close to the estimate based on the exact solution (18).
17To the best of our knowledge for the adjustment cost parameter there is no direct estimate
available in the extant literature except Basu et al. (2012) . However, Basu et al. employ physical
capital adjustment cost technology while in the present setting we have a human capital adjustment
cost technology. However, the same claibrated value for  generates a plausible estimate for the
response to luck.
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Table 1: Benchmark values
Preference and technology parameters:  = 0:3, a1 = 1:96, a2 = 1:655
Production and policy parameter:  = 0:5,  = 0:8,  = 0:03
Inequality parameter 2 = 0:38
Table 2: E¤ects of adjustment cost on inequality, mobility and growth
Adjustment cost () % 2 
0:9 0.6990 0.2793 0.0477
0:85 0.7157 0.2605 0.0317
0:8 0.7324 0.2422 0.0179
0:75 0.7491 0.2243 0.0066
0:7 0.7659 0.2069 -0.0021
0:6 0.7993 0.1732 -0.0108
Tables 2, 3 and 4 show the e¤ects of adjustment cost, depreciation costs and
the TFP on social mobility, inequality and growth based on the exact closed form
solutions (18), (19). Higher adjustment cost and lower depreciation cost (lower ,
lower , lower a1), slow down intergenerational mobility (higher %). On the other
hand, the same factors contribute to a lower long-run growth rate () and lower
steady state inequality for the reasons mentioned earlier.
Figure 3 demonstrates the e¤ects of changes in adjustment and depreciation costs
respectively on the distributional dynamics. Given the baseline values of other pa-
rameters, a higher adjustment cost (from  = 0:8 to  = 0:6) slows down the social
Table 3: E¤ects of depreciation cost on inequality, mobility and growth
Depreciation cost () % 2 
0:2 0.7159 0.2581 -0.0341
0:15 0.7210 0.2532 -0.0184
0:13 0.7230 0.2513 -0.0122
0:10 0.7259 0.2485 -0.003
0:05 0.7306 0.244 0.012
0:03 0.7324 0.2422 0.0179
0:01 0.7342 0.2405 0.0238
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Table 4: E¤ects of taxation on inequality, mobility and growth
TFP (a1) % 2 
1:68 0.7464 0.2290 -0.0591
1:82 0.7391 0.2359 -0.0196
1:96 0.7324 0.2422 0.0179
2:0 0.7306 0.2480 0.0538
2:1 0.7264 0.2533 0.0880
2:24 0.7209 0.2582 0.1208
2:52 0.7112 0.2627 0.1524
mobility by about 10 generations. A lower rate of depreciation by 2% slows down
the convergence by about 4 generations.
Figure 4 compares growth dynamics with respect to changes in ,  and a1. The
growth dynamics is driven by the distributional dynamics shown in (19). The gure
shows transitional dynamics following a 1% shock to inequality from its steady-state
level. The sudden rise in inequality results in a sharp fall in growth, initially. But
eventually it starts to pick up as inequality declines towards its steady-state. The
speed of convergence is lower for higher adjustment cost (lower ), lower depreciation
and TFP (a1).
Adjustment, depreciation costs and TFP, with inequality dynamics.
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Adjustment, depreciation costs and TFP, with growth dynamics.
3.1. E¤ect of luck on social mobility
Parents luck impacts the di¤erence in wealth of their children immediately through
the optimal investment function (8). This inequality transmits to the future gener-
ations through adjustment of human capital stock. If it is costly to adjust human
capital, luck e¤ect of parents could persist over generations. To see this, start from
a steady state where all agents are identical in terms of human capital and let the
initial generations experience some lucks (say, ith family enjoys a good luck and jth
family su¤ers a bad luck). Figures 3 and 4 plot (16) the impulse responses of 0:1
standard deviation di¤erence in such luck on the time path of dynastic inequality for
two values of the adjustment cost parameters ( = 0:8 and  = 0:6). When  = 0:8
convergence occurs after 20 generations whereas it takes more than 25 generations
to converge when  = 0:6. This reinforces our earlier result that a higher adjustment
cost slows down social mobility.
Figure 5 plots the same impulse responses when  is increased from its baseline
value. Such an increase in  slows down convergence considerably for well known
reasons mentioned earlier. The social mobility slows down for at least 10 generations
in response to such an increase.
A change in depreciation alone has an insignicant e¤ect on the transmission of
inequality (plots of which we omit here for brevity). However, incomplete depreci-
ation greatly inuences the e¤ect of TFP on social mobility for reasons mentioned
earlier. Figure 7 demonstrates the e¤ect of a lower a1 on the impulse responses with
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Figure 3: E¤ect of a di¤erence in luck on human capital when  = 0:6 and  = 0:8
Figure 4: E¤ect of a di¤erence in luck on human capital when  = 0:5 and  = 0:7
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Figure 5: E¤ect of a di¤erence in luck on human capital when a1 = 1:96 and a1 = 3:5
respect to luck. In response to such a lower TFP, the social mobility is thwarted for
at least 17 generations for the reasons mentioned earlier.
4. Conclusion
This paper has developed models that analyze the distributional e¤ects of human
capital adjustment cost within an incomplete market and a heterogeneous economy.
The source of endogenous inequality is missing credit and insurance markets. When
individuals cannot perfectly insure themselves from future income uncertainty and,
the credit market is imperfect, inequality persists. The dynamics of aggregate vari-
ables and inequality are jointly determined. The presence of a higher adjustment cost
and lower depreciation cost for human capital slows down intergenerational mobility
and results in a persistent inequality across generations. A lower TFP aggravates
social immobility further when there is incomplete depreciation of capital. The quan-
titative analysis of our model suggests that the human capital adjustment cost has to
be nontrivial to reconcile long run growth, inequality and social mobility. A possible
extension of our work is to examine the role of government redistributive policy in
determining social mobility in an environment where it is costly to adjust human
capital.
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Appendix
A. Derivation of the loglinear form
To derive (12), rst rewrite the ith individual optimal human capital accumula-
tion (10) as
lnhit+1 = ln+ lnhit +  ln
 
1   + a1'it (hit=ht) 1

(A.1)
Applying the rst order Taylor expansion in (A.2) around hit+1 = ht+1, hit = ht and
'it = ' = 1, one obtains
lnhit+1 ' ln+  ln (1   + a1) + lnhit + (  1) lnehit +  ln'it (A.2)
where lnehit  lnhit   lnht,   a1= (1   + a1) and %  1   (1   ), which is
rewritten as (12).
To derive the loglinearized version of the growth eqs. (22) and (27), aggregate
(A.2),
E [lnhit+1] = ln+  ln (1   + a1) + E [lnhit] + (  1)E
h
lnehiti+ E [ln'it]
lnht+1   0:52t+1 = ln+  ln (1   + a1) +
 
lnht   0:52t
  0:5 (  1)2t   0:52
(A.3)
since E [lnhit] = lnht   0:52t . Rearranging and simplifying this, one obtains,
t+1 = ln+  [ln (1   + a1)]  0:5 (1 + (  1))2t   0:52 + 0:52t+1 (A.4)
where t+1  lnht+1   lnht. Substituting (20) into the above yields:
t+1 = ln+  [ln (1   + a1)] + 0:5 (  1) 2 + 0:5% (%  1)2t
Finally, the steady state growth rate (27) is derived as follows, considering (25)
and (22):
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 = ln+  [ln (1   + a1)] + 0:5 (  1) 2 + 0:5% (%  1)
 
22=
 
1  %2
= ln+  [ln (1   + a1)]  0:52 ((2 +  (  2)) = (2  (1  )))
B. Aggregation and distribution dynamics
In this section we derive (18) from (10). We can also rewrite (10) as
(hit+1)
& = &
 
h&it+ t'ith
{+&
it

(B.5)
where &  1=, {    1,   1   and t  a1h1 t .
Recall that rst 'it and hit are assumed to have lognormal distributions:
ln'it  N( 2=2; 2) (B.6)
lnhit  N(t; 2t ) (B.7)
And, from a normal-lognormal relationship, we have:
E [hit]  ht = et+0:52t (B.8)
var [hit] =

e
2
t   1

e2t+
2
t (B.9)
If hit, then (hit)
x is also lognormal for any constant x.
ln (hit)
x  N(xt; x22t ) (B.10)
Thus, considering (B.10), (B.8) and (B.9), we have:
E [(hit)
x] = (ht)
x e0:5
2
tx(x 1) (B.11)
var [(hit)
x] = (ht)
2x e
2
tx(x 1)

ex
22t   1

(B.12)
We now apply (B.11) and (B.12) to derive the following important relations that
we use latter on:
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E [(hit+1)
& ] = h&t+1e
0:5&(& 1)2t+1 (B.13)
E [h
&
it] = h
&
te
0:5&(& 1)2t (B.14)
E

h&+{it

= h&+{t e
0:5(&+{)(&+{ 1)2t (B.15)
E

h2&+{it

= h2&+{t e
0:5(2&+{)(2&+{ 1)2t (B.16)
E ['it] = 1 (B.17)
var

h&it+1

= h2&t+1e
&(& 1)2t+1

e&
22t+1   1

(B.18)
var ['it] =

e
2   1

(B.19)
var [h&it] = h
2&
t e
&(& 1)2t

e&
22t   1

(B.20)
var

h&+{it

= h
2(&+{)
t e
(&+{)(&+{ 1)2t

e(&+{)
22t   1

(B.21)
Then, aggregate (B.5) from both side to derive the aggregate human capital:
E [(hit+1)
& ] = 1= E

h&it+ t'ith
&+{
it

= 1=

E [h
&
it] + t E

h&+{it
	
Substituting (B.13), (B.14) and (B.15) into the above,
h&t+1e
0:5&(& 1)2t+1 = &
n
h&te
0:5&(& 1)2t + th&+{t e
0:5(&+{)(&+{ 1)2t
o
= &h&t
n
e0:5&(& 1)
2
t + a1e
0:5[&(& 1)+&{+{(&+{ 1)]2t
o
Thus, the aggregate human capital is given by:
h&t+1e
0:5&(& 1)2t+1 = &h&te
0:5&(& 1)2t
n
+ a1e
0:5{(2&+{ 1)2t
o
(B.22)
To derive the distributional dynamics, take the variance from both sides of (B.5),
var [(hi;t+1)
& ] = 2& var

h&it+ t'ith
&+{
it

= 2&

2 var [h&it] + 
2
t var

'ith
&+{
it

+ 2t cov
 
h&it; 'ith
&+{
it

(B.23)
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Using (B.14), (B.15), (B.16) and (B.17), the cov term is computed as follows:
cov
 
h&it; 'ith
&+{
it

= E

h&it'ith
&+{
it
  E [h&it] E 'ith&+{it 
= E

h2&+it
  E [h&it] E h&+{it 
= h2&+{t e
0:5(2&+{)(2&+{ 1)2t   h&te0:5&(& 1)
2
th&+{t e
0:5(&+{)(&+{ 1)2t
= h2&+{t e
0:5({(2&+{ 1)+2&(& 1))2t

e&(&+{)
2
t   1

(B.24)
The second term in the right hand side of (B.23) is computed as,18
var

'ith
&+{
it

= (E ['it])
2 var

h&+{it

+ var ['it]
 
E

h&+{it
2
+ var

h&+{it

= var

h&+{it

(1 + var ['it]) + var ['it]
 
E

h&+{it
2
since E ['it] = 1.
Substituting (B.15), (B.19) and (B.21) into the above yields:
var

'ith
&+{
it

= h
2(&+{)
t e
(&+{)(&+{ 1)2t

e(&+{)
22t   1

1 +

e
2   1

+

e
2   1

h
2(&+{)
t e
(&+{)(&+{ 1)2t
= h
2(&+{)
t e
(&+{)(&+{ 1)2t

e(&+{)
22t   1

e
2
+

e
2   1

= h
2(&+{)
t e
({(2&+{ 1)+&(& 1))2t

e(&+{)
22t e
2   1

(B.25)
Then, substituting, (B.18), (B.20), (B.24) and (B.25) into (B.23) yields:
18If x and y are independent, the variance of their product is:
var [xy] = (E [x])
2
var [y] + (E [y])
2
var [x] + var [y] var [x]
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h2&t+1e
&(& 1)2t+1

e&
22t+1   1

= 2&
26664
h2&2t e
&(& 1)2t

e&
22t   1

+2t
n
h
2(&+{)
t e
[{(2&+{ 1)+&(& 1)]2t

e(&+{)
22t e
2   1
o
+2t
n
h2&+{t e
0:5[{(2&+{ 1)+2&(& 1)]2t

e&(&+{)
2
t   1
o
37775 (B.26)
Finally, substituting (B.22) into the above, we get :
2&h2&t e
&(& 1)2t
n
+ a1e
0:5{(2&+{ 1)2t
o2 
e&
22t+1   1

= 2&h2&t
26664
2e&(& 1)
2
t

e&
22t   1

+(a1)
2
n
e[{(2&+{ 1)+&(& 1)]
2
t

e(&+{)
22t e
2   1
o
+2a1
n
e0:5[{(2&+{ 1)+2&(& 1)]
2
t

e&{
2
t   1
o
37775 (B.27)
since t  a1h {t .
Considering,
+ a1e
0:5{(2&+{ 1)2t
2
= 2 + 2a1e
0:5{(2&+{ 1)2t + (a1)2e({(2&+{ 1))
2
t
further simplifying (B.27) gives
e&
22t+1 =
2e&
22t + (a1)
2

e{(2&+{ 1)
2
t e(&+{)
22t e
2

+ 2a1

e0:5{(2&+{ 1)
2
t e&(&+{)
2
t

 
+ a1e0:5{(2&+{ 1)
2
t
2
Alternatively,
e
 22t+1 =
2e
 22t + (a1)
2

e[( 1)(2=+ 2)+(1=+ 1)
2]2t+2

+ 2a1

e[0:5( 1)(2=+ 2)+(1=+ 1)=]
2
t

 
+ a1e0:5( 1)(2=+ 2)
2
t
2
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after substituting &  1=, {    1. Or,
e
 22t+1 =
2e
 22t + (a1)
2

e(!+
2)2t+2

+ 2a1

e(0:5!+=)
2
t

 
+ a1e0:5!
2
t
2 (B.28)
where
!  (  1) (2= +   2) < 0,   1= +   1 > 0
as given by (18).
B.1. Steady State
The steady-state inequality and growth are given by the following equations,
considering (B.22) and (B.28), respectively:
2 = 2 ln
2 exp
 
 22

+ (a1)
22 exp
  
! + 2

2

+ 2a1 exp ((0:5! + =)
2)
(+ a1 exp (0:5!2))
2
(B.29)
and
 = ln+  ln

1   + a1 exp
 
0:5!2
	
(B.30)
where   ln (ht+1=h) and 2 = 2t+1 = 2t .
B.2. Social mobility
The social mobility parameter, , is derived by simply taking the rst derivative
of (B.28):
  @2t+1=@2t
=

2 2 exp( 22t ) + (a1)
2b1b2 exp(b2
2
t ) + 2a1b3 exp(b3
2
t )
2 exp( 22t ) + (a1)2b1 exp(b22t ) + 2a1 exp(b32t )
  a1! exp(0:5!
2
t )
+ a1 exp(0:5!2t )

2
where
b1  exp
 
2

, b2  ! + 2, b3  0:5! + =
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C. A model of dynastic altruism with labour and capital
In this appendix, we show that the key result that a higher adjustment cost
slows down social mobility continues to hold in a model with dynastic altruism as in
Barro (1974) with labour and physical capital. Each generation lives one period and
discounts the future generations utility by : The ith agent born at date t has the
utility function:
vit = ln cit + b ln(1  lgit   lhit) + Etvit+1 (C.31)
where lgit =labour time spend on good production, l
h
it =labour time spent on childs
education and b 2 (0; 1) is the relative importance of leisure in utility. The total
time is normalized at unity. We assume for simplicity that the technology of goods
production requires a xed amount of raw labour time (say 8 hours a day) and the
adult has no choice to allocate more or less time to it. Thus x lgit =
 
lig . The
remaining time can be allocated freely between leisure and childs education. The
goods production function is thus:
xit = 'it
  
lighit
$
kith

t (C.32)
where kit is physical capital and the production function obeys constant returns to
scale property meaning $ +  +  = 1:
The human capital production function is specied as (assuming  = 1 for ana-
lytical tractability.
hit+1 = h
1 
it (l
h
itsit)
 (C.33)
The e¤ective investment in human capital is the raw labour (lhit) spent on children
times resources (sit) spent childs schooling.
Although parents cannot borrow against their o¤springs human capital because
of immutable moral hazard and adverse selection issues, they have an access to an
international credit market to nance their purchase of physical capital, kit at a xed
interest rate r: The adult fully pays o¤ the loan with interest before the end of their
life. All physical capital is used up in the production process and nothing is left for
the upcoming generation. The optimal purchase of capital is thus given by equality
between the marginal product of physical capital and the user cost of capital, which
means,
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@xit
@kit
= r + k (C.34)
where k is the rate of depreciation of physical capital.19 The adults value added
(yit) after paying o¤ the debt is given by,
yit = xit   (r + k)kit (C.35)
Substituting out kit using (C.34) and (C.32), equation (C.35) can be rewritten
as:
yit = fth

ith
1 
t
where ft= '
1
1 
it
 
lig
$
1   

r
 
1  (1  ) and  = $
1  .
The ith adult is subject to the budget constraint:
cit + sit = yit (C.36)
and he maximizes (C.31) subject to (C.36 and C.33) taking {'itg and {htg as given.
The value function for this problem can be written as:
v(hit; zt) = Maxhit+1
"
ln
(
yit   h
(1=)
it+1
h
(1 )=
it
)
+ b ln(1 
 
lig   lhit) + Etv(hit+1; zt+1)
#
(C.37)
The proof mimics Basu (1987). Conjecture that the value function is loglinear in
state variables as follows:
v(hit; zt) = 0 + 1 lnhit + 2 ln zt (C.38)
where zt = ft
 
lgh
1 
t : Plugging (C.38) into the value function (C.37),
19To see this arbitrage condition, note that the adults choice of physical capital solves the static
maximization problem:
max
kit
[xit + (1  k)kit   (1 + r)kit]
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0 + 1 lnhit + 2 ln zt (C.39)
= Maxhit+1
"
ln
(
yit   h
(1=)
it+1
h
(1 )=
it
)
+ b ln(1 
 
lig   lhit) +  f0 + 1 lnhit+1 + ln zt+1g
#
We will use the method of undetermined coe¢ cients to solve for i which only
matters for determining the decision rule of investment. Conjecture that lhit is time
invariant and is equal to lhi .
Di¤erentiating with respect to hit+1 and rearranging terms one gets:
hit+1 =

1
1 + 1

h+1 it l
h
i z

t (C.40)
Plugging (C.40) into (C.39) and comparing the left hand side and right hand side
coe¢ cients of the value function we can uniquely solve 1 as follows:
1 =

1  ( + 1  )
which after plugging into (C.40) we get,
hit+1 =


1  (1  )

h +1 it l
h
it z

t (C.41)
Next solve lhi by noting the fact that
lhi = arg max[b ln(1 
 
lig   lhit) + 1 ln lhit]
which gives
lhit =
1(1 
 
lg)
b+ 1
(C.42)
Time devoted to education is thus a constant conrming our conjecture. Note
that lhit is also increasing in :
C.1. Distributional dynamics
Based on (C.41) the social mobility equation is given by,
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lnhit+1 =
 
m+ ( + 1  ) lnhit + (ln zt) (C.43)
where
 
m =  ln
(1  b) + b(1  (1  ))
1  (1  ) +  ln


1  (1  )

Note that (C.43) takes the same form as (12). the social mobility parameter is
the same as % when  = 1 and so is the response to luck. The dynamics of cross
sectional variance of wealth based on (C.43) is given by,
2t+1 = ( + 1  )22t +
22
2
(C.44)
which display similar properties as in our baseline "joy of giving" utility function.
Higher adjustment cost (lower ) and a higher capital share parameter () slows
down intergenerational mobility and raises the persistence of inequality as before.
C.1.1. Long run inequality and growth
Long run inequality based on (C.44) is given by:
2 =
22
2[1  ( + 1  )2] (C.45)
To get the long run growth use (C.43) to get:
Ei lnhit+1 =
 
m+ ( + 1  )Ei lnhit + (1  ) lnht   
2
2
=> lnht+1   :52t+1 =
 
m+ ( + 1  )(lnht   :52t ) + (1  ) lnht  
2
2
Along a balanced growth path, 2t+1 = 
2
t = 
2 as in (C.45) and lnht+1  lnht = 
which means
 =
 
m  :5(1  )2   
2
2
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